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Abstract 
A growing literature has emerged on employee silence, located within the field of 
organisational behaviour. Scholars have investigated when and how employees articulate 
voice and when and how they will opt for silence. Whilst offering many insights, this analysis 
is inherently one-sided in its interpretation of silence as a product of employee motivations. 
An alternative reading of silence is offered which focuses on the role of management. Using 
the non-union employee representation literature for illustrative purposes, the significance of 
management in structuring employee silence is considered. Highlighted are the ways in 
which management, through agenda-setting and institutional structures, can perpetuate 
silence over a range of issues; organising them out of the voice process. These considerations 
are redeployed to offer a dialectical interpretation of employee silence in a conceptual 
framework to assist further research and analysis. 
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 1 
 Introduction  
Employee voice is a theme that is widely ensconced in both practitioner and academic 
concerns on management and organisational analysis. Invariably, interest in voice has ranged 
from the high performance literature (Boxall and Macky, 2009), wherein it is conceived as 
part of a bundle of practices, to ethically-driven notions of industrial citizenship (Wilkinson 
et al. 2009). One of the more significant contributions to the area of voice has been research 
dedicated to examining the antithesis of voice: employee silence. Defining silence as an 
employee’s ‘motivation to withhold or express ideas, information and opinions about work-
related improvements’ (Van Dyne et al. 2003, p. 1361), this strain of analysis has sought to 
investigate when and how employees in organisational settings exercise voice and when and 
how they opt for silence (Milliken et al. 2003). A number of research questions have been 
generated to examine why employees make the decision to be silent, what types of issues 
employees are likely to be silent about and how organisations might surmount this ‘problem’.  
 
This article seeks to draw attention to some of the underlying conceptual weaknesses 
characterising the analysis of employee silence. Weaknesses lie in the types of questions 
being asked and the unitarist premises upon which much of the debate has been predicated. 
The central argument of this article is that existing efforts have generally focused on silence 
as something which employees choose, thereby overlooking the more significant constraints 
imposed by management in preserving their supposed prerogative. Central to the argument is 
that management, through agenda-setting and institutional structures, may well perpetuate 
silence on a range of issues which are effectively organised out of the voice process in favour 
of less threatening items. It is argued that a re-fitting of the conceptual lens onto how 
employee silences are structured could offer a potentially more salient mode of enquiry. 
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 The article proceeds as follows. First, the literature on employee silence is considered 
followed by a section explaining the limitations of existing interpretations. Section three then 
elaborates our mode of re-conceptualisation, focusing on the role of management. To 
illustrate this elaboration, evidence is drawn on the operation of employee voice schemes of 
non-union employee representation (NERs). It is, in many ways, a product of contemporary 
circumstance that as union-based modes of employee voice precipitously decline, interest in 
other forms of employee voice has grown steadily, as scholars are increasingly concerned 
with how voice is articulated in union-free environments. The reasons are twofold. First, 
NERs are becoming increasingly prominent as a vehicle for employee voice in countries 
marked by union decline and are likely to be of growing relevance for understanding voice 
dynamics in contemporary organisations. Secondly, given the operational difficulties which 
inevitably surround a conceptual proposition which has at its focus the often unobservable 
process of management agenda-setting, the literature on NERs is instructive given its focus 
on motivations for introducing arrangements of this sort, as well as their subsequent 
administration and control. The literature has consequently discerned what types of issues 
management allow on the voice agenda and those areas they would rather leave untouched. In 
section four, a conceptual framework is outlined which allows a more holistic approach to 
organisational silences than extant efforts. Finally, the article concludes with a summary of 
the main arguments and suggestions for future research in section five. 
 
The Study of Employee Silence: A Review and Critique 
The literature on employee silence is a relatively new phenomenon. Nonetheless, a resonance 
of its concerns can be found in earlier research on voice. In his now classic Exit-Voice-
Loyalty (EVL) framework, Hirschman (1970) sought to demonstrate the ways in which 
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customers might break their silence in an attempt to change objectionable states of affairs 
through either voice or exit. Where neither option applied, they could opt to “suffer in 
silence, confident that things will soon get better” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 38). Similarly, when 
the EVL literature was adapted to employment relations, it was proposed that employee 
dissatisfaction could produce slack and disregardful behaviour, allowing the relationship to 
atrophy, as alienated employees withdrew from committed organisational participation to 
more silent, alienative postures (Rusbult et al. 1982; Farrell, 1983; Naus et al. 2007).  Indeed 
employees’ efforts to break silences could often bring about a further deterioration in one’s 
relationship with the firm. Feuille and Delaney (1992), for instance, observed that individuals 
who opted to exercise voice tended to suffer adverse consequences for doing so. Furthermore, 
these employees had higher turnover rates than those who remained silent. Similarly, others 
have indicated that silence is often the best option for employees, as those who exercise voice 
often faced a risk to reputation, frequently suffering sanction or retaliation (Graham, 1986; 
Nord and Jermier, 1994).  
 
It is only more recently that employee silence has emerged as a formal category of analytical 
investigation in its own right. Principally, this literature has sought to understand how 
individuals in organisations make the decision to be silent about issues that concern them and 
about which types of issues employees are likely to be silent. Specifically, silence has been 
conceptualised as information which is consciously held back by employees, rather than an 
unintentional failure to communicate or simply having nothing to say (Tangirala and 
Ramanujam, 2008). It is thus a communicative choice which employees may decide to adopt. 
This approach tends to focus explicitly on the intentional withholding of ideas, information 
and opinions with relevance to improvements in work and work organisation (Van Dyne et 
al. 2003). Indeed, Van Dyne and Lepine (1998, p. 109) assert that the study of employee 
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communication (or lack thereof) should be located in organisations where the work 
environment is “dynamic” and “new ideas facilitate continuous improvement”. Rolling back 
employee silence is seen as an organisational imperative: its existence prevents management 
from receiving information that might allow for improvements or circumvent problems 
before the effects become seriously damaging.  
 
While largely conceiving employee silence as something of a freely undertaken choice, the 
literature has acknowledged that it can be influenced by top management. Morrison and 
Milliken (2000), for example, have sought to explain why silence is systemic in many 
workplaces, and the kinds of norms and forces that set it in process and reinforce it. 
Principally, they target the role of top management. Pinder and Harlos (2001) argue that a 
climate of silence amongst employees is likely where speaking up is perceived to be futile or 
dangerous. These perceptions emanate from a management who act in a way that discourages 
communication from below so that where management are intolerant of dissent, employees 
are consequently averse to voicing their concerns (Ashford et al. 1998; Dutton et al. 2001). 
These perceptions, Morrison and Milliken claim, are a product of managements’ recalcitrance 
to receiving negative feedback about either them personally or about a course of action 
associated with them. Whilst in another study, Milliken et al. (2003) cite silence as a product 
of resignation amongst employees due to a perception that their voice falls on ‘deaf ears’ (c.f. 
Pideri and Ashford, 2003; Van Dyne et al. 2003). Complementing these ideas is 
Edmondson’s (2003) work, which has pointed to the importance of leaders in creating a voice 
climate wherein employees feel comfortable about raising problems.  
 
Serving as a backdrop to these relational dynamics are the structural constraints of wider 
demographic and organisational constraints, all of which are hypothesised to produce 
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tendencies towards employee silences, e.g. management with financial background; 
homogeneity of the management grouping; cost focused organisations operating in 
competitive environments with a diminished resource base; the density of social network ties 
amongst mid- to lower-level employees and so on (Morrison and Milliken, 2000). Similarly, 
Huang et al. (2005) have hinted at the determining influence of social context, arguing that 
cultures with large ‘power distance’ will have higher levels of employee silence. Others have 
seen fit to shift away the analysis from hierarchical-based dynamics to more lateral influences 
in terms of how silence is influenced by employee perceptions of what their co-workers 
think. This analysis proposes that the withholding of true opinions is generated from an 
individual’s fear of isolation from the workgroup, particularly where they believe that they 
hold a minority viewpoint (Bowen and Blackmon, 2003; Milliken et al. 2003). Finally, there 
has also been a tendency to treat silence as a product of psychological factors stemming from 
individual employee’s personality characteristics (Premeaux and Bedeian, 2003). 
 
Although the existing literature can be credited with making inroads into the analysis of 
employee silence, the approach has been debilitated by a pervasive managerialist bias that 
narrows the kinds of questions it asks and the explanations it offers. Much of this approach 
stems from the remit of its orientation as evident in the Van Dyne and Lepine quotation 
above; the study of silence is confined to those firms where the workforce is ‘dynamic’ and 
where the articulation of voice would be of benefit to management. Indeed, according to 
Tangirala and Ramanujam (2008, p. 38), silence is only “negative” insofar as a “continuous 
process improvement requires the ongoing identification of operational problems that can 
illuminate faults in existing work practices”. Similarly, Huang et al. (2005) counsel 
management that encouraging employees to voice their concerns, opinions and dissenting 
views will enable organisational change and development in a competitive market. In many 
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ways, these kinds of argument suffer from a paradox: Morrison and Miliken (2000), for 
example, submit that management are often hostile to employee voice, but such hostility is 
construed to be concerned entirely with improving business performance. Such themes are 
not addressed given the over-riding concern with apparently shared goals. 
 
Morrison and Milliken (2000), while stating encouragingly that employee silence is likely to 
pose an obstacle to “truly pluralist organizations” (p.707), offer a truncated reading of what 
organisational pluralism might represent, in claiming, for instance, that pluralism allows for a 
“tolerance of multiple and often conflicting viewpoints” (p.719). Another view of pluralism 
would extend this interpretation to a recognition that it is as much about workers having 
structurally conditioned independent interests and goals which frequently stand apart from 
management, as it is about different shades of opinion. This rather diluted take on pluralism 
is further in evidence when Morrison and Milliken (2000, p. 719) proceed to claim that 
workers can be free to “deviate” from the management line provided that it “has a positive 
effect on both the quality of organizational decision making and company performance”. Yet 
such deviation can hardly be characterised as pluralism: genuine pluralism rests upon social 
values which recognise the right of employees to an effective voice in their own destiny, 
regardless of the consequences for management (Fox, 1985). 
 
Indeed Morrison and Milliken (2000, p. 731) talk about management “capitalising on 
pluralism”, essentially circumventing ‘plurality’ to monistic and employer-defined goals. 
They go further in suggesting that unlimited employee input is not desirable: “too much 
input” might overload decision-making processes and impede timely and effective decision 
making. The argument resonates with a number of other efforts on employee silence wherein 
absences of voice are interpreted such that the phenomenon is portrayed as an organisational 
 7 
good, i.e. concealment of trade secrets, professional confidences and so on (Podsakoff et al. 
2000). Ultimately then, voice is favoured, but it is a deficient rendering, framed only in terms 
of the benefits it could deliver to managerial efficiency.  
 
Unfortunately, these assumptions run through the literature in other ways and are often 
manifested through the articulation of Human Relations assumptions about organisational 
relationships. The characteristic tendency of such efforts is to reduce the employment 
relationship to a chiefly inter-personal affair, inebriated by psychological and even emotive 
features. For example, Morrison and Milliken (2003, p. 1564) propose that management do 
not accept or embrace information from employees on the basis of “very human reasons” or 
some inevitable, even innate “human tendency”. There is a danger of viewing managerial 
opposition to voice as something of a personality quirk, in contrast to other explanations 
which would emphasise structural-based issues of power, authority and control.  
 
At one level this tendency is unsurprising, given that the literature on employee silence 
appears heavily indebted to communication theory. Obvious examples are Van Dyne et al. 
(1995), who declare their focus is on employees’ actual communicative choices, rather than 
perceptions of procedural opportunities, a somewhat odd posture given the probability that 
communicative choices are likely to correlate with procedural opportunities. Indeed, in spite 
of respondents in Milliken et al. (2003) citing hierarchical structure and organisational 
characteristics as the second most important reason for remaining silent, they entirely over-
look this explanation in their discussion, opting instead to focus on employees fears of being 
viewed “a tattletale” (pg. 1470). Indeed much of the literature appears to be underscored by 
an assumption that the requisite vehicles for voice are present in organisations. What is 
missing from the literature  is an appreciation of the institutional opportunities employees 
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have for articulating voice. While the presence of institutional arrangements in no way 
guarantees voice (Harlos, 2001), where they are absent, or procedurally ineffective, then this 
absence is likely to be of some explanatory importance in understanding the existence of 
employee silence. Furthermore, it might be said that the extant literature has adopted a 
somewhat naïve view about the particular interests which organisational participants bring to 
bear in the workplace. Notable is the idea that management should be concerned about 
silence and should try to rectify it. The problem with this approach is that it ignores whole 
areas of organisational life where silence is expedient for management and where it may 
often be in their interest to maintain the status quo. Indeed, Morrison and Milliken (2003, p. 
1567) confirm this expediency when they indicate that silence can be functional for 
management, advising that unrestricted voice is, in fact, “dysfunctional”.   
 
Equally, the assumption that employees seek active involvement in the organisation and hold 
altruistic motives of concern for the corporation which are only stymied by faulty 
management practice is questionable. Whilst it is plausible that employees may be keen to 
articulate ideas for the improvement of their organisation and may be prevented from doing 
so by a lack of management support, there is also evidence that employee silences might, at 
times, be a product of cynicism, distrust or merely a defensive positioning in the frontier of 
control that is the employment relationship. Indeed the former interpretation, which 
dominates the silence literature, stems from an over-reliance on certain occupational 
groupings. Thus, employees used to make wider generalisations hitherto have been the likes 
of management consultants (Milliken et al., 2003) or nurses (Tangirala and Ramanujam, 
2008): occupational types which might be expected to exercise high affective commitment to 
either their employing organisation or profession. An engagement with other occupational 
groupings, like those frequently found in the wider sociology of work, may demonstrate very 
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different interpretations. Here, the silence from below is often characterised as a survival 
strategy, where employees with low attachment to the organisation ‘mentally withdraw’ to 
cope with work’s more unpleasant aspects (Delbridge, 1998; Ezzamel et al. 2000). 
 
In summary, the bias in underpinning assumptions that dominate current efforts tends to miss 
some of the more significant questions that surround employee silence. Furthermore, the 
consequences of unitary preconceptions result in rather thin prescriptions for change that 
appear to offer little to either management or employees. Huang et al. (2005, p. 475), for 
example, end their work by pleading with management to make an “extra effort” and “pay 
more attention” to reducing employee silence in large power distance cultures, a thesis which 
in many ways confounds the logic of their preceding culturally determinist analysis. That is 
not to say that the current literature on silence has produced little of value. Rather, what needs 
to be done is for current understandings of silence to be extended and pursued under a less 
constricting remit. Already there have been some efforts to broaden the study of silences 
which have taken the analysis down the route of a more post-structuralist, linguistic turn 
(Brown and Coupland, 2005; Fletcher and Watson, 2007). Whilst these efforts have advanced 
understandings of employee silence, they have tended to move the analysis away from issues 
of control and organisational rules to one which focuses heavily upon the construction of 
working life through cultural and symbolic resources. Thus, the materialist organisation of 
production is altogether left out in favour of the discursive reproduction of organisations. 
While an interesting intellectual pursuit as it stands, by remaining focused on self-referential 
discourse, these efforts appear to ignore the fact that such ideologies are not self-sustaining, 
but are rather a product of particular institutional underpinnings. Arguably, there is scope to 
examine the critical efforts that integrate material institutions, the interplay between social 
actors and the bounds of their structural context.  
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 Re-thinking employee silence: some conceptual considerations 
For all the promise displayed in the literature on employee silence, there are crucial 
conceptual limitations. A largely unremitting unitary bias has tended to by-pass the potential 
for management to deliberately fashion a climate of silence in organisations. This section 
attempts to re-balance and re-conceptualise the phenomena of silence by focusing on how 
management, through agenda-setting and institutional structures, may perpetuate a climate of 
silence. Theoretically, conceptualisations link to political science interpretations of social 
power, which posit how dominant groups can effectively organise out of the political-
exchange arena issues of potential concern to other interest groups, i.e. a mobilisation of bias 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Certainly, Allen and Tuselmann (2009) have recently argued 
for the centrality of power in the voice construct and point out that managers play an 
important role in determining what can and cannot be addressed by voice mechanisms. In this 
context, management might try to confine and enclose the voice process in organisations, 
with the result that silence reigns supreme on issues which might reasonably be assumed to 
be of interest to employees. 
 
To illustrate this dynamic, the literature which addresses the operation of non-union 
employee representation (NER) schemes, i.e. employer sponsored bodies of formally 
organised employee voice, is drawn. Of course, a crude institutional focus might be construed 
as unhelpful. Often macro-orientated, institutional studies have measured voice by the extent 
to which a set of institutional mechanisms, such as union recognition or joint consultative 
committees, are present in a particular organisation (Bryson et al. 2007; Charlwood, 2006). 
These studies often assume that the presence of a voice mechanism is equated with voice 
utility. In contrast, micro-level institutional accounts counsel that incidence per se tells little, 
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if anything, about the richness of the voice process. Whilst the focus is very much on the 
“methods that provide for employees to have a say in matters that affect them” (Dundon and 
Rollinson, 2004, p. 52), analysis is often conditioned by an awareness of the corresponding 
scope, range and embeddedness of the processes and related structures. The prevalence of an 
institutional mechanism may be shallow or deep, or it may be geared towards a focus on 
minor operational tasks than with issues of a more fundamental, power-sharing nature 
(Wilkinson et al. 2004). Thus, a voice structure may exist, but it may be little more than a 
‘hollow shell’ (Charlwood, 2003), whilst even the presence of a union as a vehicle for voice 
may be substantially hindered if that union is weak or ineffectual (Ackers et al. 2005). The 
aim here is to sensitise readers to a more institutional focus and to introduce the relevant 
points of concern which highlight ways that organisational silence might be re-interpreted. 
 
What is central to this analysis, and largely missing from the approaches reviewed earlier, is 
an appreciation of how institutions might serve to inhibit voice and enforce silence. One of 
the assumptions of the literature reviewed hitherto is that workers have some element of 
choice as to whether they remain silent; that is, they actively engage in a rational, cost-benefit 
based decision as to whether to remain silent or not.  However an approach is adopted that 
emphasises employee silence as being the result of   
A situation where workers do not have avenues to pursue issues of concern to them, 
either because of a failure of a pre-existing voice mechanisms or because of the 
absence of them altogether.  
Central to the above definition is a consideration of management and the manner in which it 
constructs voice arrangements. It is necessary to be sensitive to the fact that  
“employee voice mechanisms are often defined according to management’s own 
interpretations of what the expression of voice is taken to mean, thus shaping the 
 12 
prevailing climate in an organisation and the extent of influence which employees feel 
they have over matters that affect them” (Dundon and Rollinson, 2004, p. 55).  
While it is possible that regulatory rules and laws force management to do things that they 
would otherwise neglect (Marchington et al. 2001), management are likely to retain some 
choice, at least in determining the robustness of voice at workplace level (Willman et al. 
2006). Management behaviour then lies at the heart of the debate on the management of voice 
structures and is of analytical significance in illustrating how management can actually 
perpetuate silence across the organisation. 
 
 While it clear that NERs are not simply about union avoidance, there is nonetheless a strain 
of evidence which shows how management frequently attempt to circumvent more intrusive 
forms of employee representation through institutional arrangements (Kaufman and Taras, 
2009). NERs have been established to stave off encroachment into substantive areas of the 
managerial prerogative and to perpetuate a climate of silence on issues which might be made 
vulnerable to subordinate influence. Thus, Gall’s (2004) study of anti-union employers in the 
UK found evidence of firms creating NER arrangements to reduce the likelihood of outside 
involvement by unions in organisational decision making. Taras (2006) demonstrated similar 
efforts by management in Canada, even in the face of the more exacting legislative 
constraints which seek to prevent suppression of union-based voice. Indeed, research shows 
that employer-initiated structures may be little more than cosmetic devices to silence more 
difficult forms of union voice, confining the airing of employees’ interests to an innocuous 
remit under management control (Terry, 1999; Wills, 2000). Likewise studies of larger non-
union employers demonstrate their willingness to devote considerable time and effort to 
implementing non-union voice channels to prevent more robust and militant forms of voice 
emerging in the form of union structures (Broad, 1994; Flood and Toner, 1997). Others have 
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drawn attention to how these structures have been found to wither away progressively once 
the union threat has subsided (Peetz, 2002). Even where there is no obvious threat to 
managerial prerogative, studies on NERs illustrate how such bodies can be substantively 
debilitated by management concerns to enclose voice to issues of business efficiency and 
little else (Kirkbride, 1986).  
 
Whilst such deficiencies in NER type structures might be closely linked to the permissive 
voluntarism of Anglo-Saxon employment relations, there is evidence from more juridified 
systems of worker voice and participation which indicates a not dissimilar pattern. Royle 
(1998) has demonstrated how McDonald’s in Germany was able to manipulate the existing 
system of co-determination by narrowing the scope of the Company Works Council “to 
issues exclusively of managerial concern like customer service, quality and new working 
methods”. In Schulten’s (1996) study of MNCs, a panopoly of tactics were deployed, ranging 
from nominating salaried managers to the role of employee representatives alongside blatant 
attempts to influence election campaigns in a manner favourable to non-union candidates. 
Whitely (1999) has outlined how statutory provisions for voice can be further circumvented 
as companies exploit the internal heterogeneity of national business systems and locate units 
in, for example, less developed areas, areas of high unemployment or low union organisation 
and where consequently the workforce is less likely to raise issues challenging the managerial 
prerogative. As Kahn-Freund’s (1977, p. 2) has argued, legal provisions are likely to be but a 
“secondary force in human affairs, and especially in labour relations”; there are limits to how 
far the law can be used to shape the behaviour of institutional actors and social outcomes. 
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This approach does not suggest that it represents the full range of NER structures or 
management motivations. Equally, it does not suggest there is an omniscient management; 
employees retain agency and this agency will affect their willingness to air concerns across 
both issues which may be beneficial to the organization and on issues where concerns are not 
mutual. Studies in the institutional literature have shown that managerially-imposed shackles 
on NER’s sphere of influence can often prove, for management, partial and counter-
productive. Two outcomes in particular appear noteworthy. One is the further withdrawal of 
an increasingly cynical workforce. Workers based in a Japanese MNC in Waitling and 
Snook’s (2003) research saw the NER scheme as lacking independence, being ‘all talk’ and 
‘no voice’. Employees tended to be disparaging of NER delegates, perceiving them as being 
in the ‘pockets’ of management. In Dundon and Rollinson’s (2004) study of NERs, the voice 
schemes were designed and controlled from above. Where employees could contribute, it was 
on matters deemed appropriate by management. The most striking feature is that on more 
substantive issues, such as wages or conditions, few employees in these case studies 
expressed satisfaction with the arrangements. The result is that employer imposed restrictions 
on what employees can seek influence over leads to the diminution of the structures: voice 
over an already limited remit recedes and employee silences are further deepened and 
perpetuated. This result may not necessarily have been management intent, but a 
disinclination to open up more substantial areas of decision-making to employee influence 
produces such outcomes. The second response to managerially defined walls of silence 
appears more paradoxical; management efforts to open up space for employee voice under 
the rubric of management-sponsored structures prove counter-productive. Taras and 
Copping’s (1998) study of an NER at Imperial Oil found that management encouraged the 
view amongst employees that their voice was important and would be taken seriously in 
influencing strategic decisions. The NER arrangements led to widened expectations for voice, 
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with employee representatives over-estimating their capacity to halt corporate-led initiatives. 
Despite management efforts to preserve employee silences on issues which would infringe on 
prerogatives, the reality of a less than receptive management seeking to keep substantive 
issues off the agenda, led to employee frustrations, a consequent rejection of the voice 
structure and a switch in allegiances to a previously marginalised union.  
 
What the studies suggest is that underscoring practices of maintaining employee silences is 
essentially a managerialist interpretation of voice about increasing information and 
communication, rather than negotiation or bargaining. Specific to the above analysis of 
NERs, it appears that management view such structures as a means of increasing company 
efficiency and promoting an understanding of company policy rather than an effective forum 
of representation for the diverging interests of employees. What is notable in Dundon et al’s. 
(2005) study of management attitudes to voice is the pervasive tendency to view it as simply 
the transmission of information to employees to improve organisational performance, rather 
than dialogue or the two-way exchange of information. Employees were seen as receptacles 
of knowledge; voice was about the generation of ideas that could help improve organisational 
effectiveness: not one management respondent interviewed, for example, mentioned 
grievance procedures as a form of voice. Similarly, as Butler (2009) outlines, efforts by 
employees to raise more substantive issues, outside of typical “tea-and-toilet roll” concerns, 
fell upon deaf ears as management sought to preserve the realm of the NER to issues 
subservient to their prerogative. As Terry (1999, p. 29) has argued, management might be in 
favour of systems of employee participation but “they just draw the line at sharing 
meaningful information with them”. What resonates here are agency theories of the firm 
which propose that when the principal delegates to the agent, it wants an effective decision-
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making structure and one which leads to outcomes that maximize the principal's goals and 
not some other goals of the agents (Gollan, 2005). Such pressures create a disincentive to 
prolonging decision-making processes, given that they provide less than optimal outcomes 
for the firm. There may be an incentive for employers to contain consultation and bargaining 
processes within the organisation to ensure minimum disruption occurs during the 
‘production process’, thus safeguarding continuity in the managerial prerogative. 
 
Advancing the conceptualisation of silence 
Hitherto it has been argued that the organizational behaviour literature has offered a novel 
development into the relatively unexplored realm of organisational silences. This literature 
has suffered from a number of deficiencies, frequently rooted in the unitarist underpinnings 
of this approach. Consequently, this article refocuses the analytical lens on management 
“silencing” workers and illustrates this approach with recourse to the institutional literature 
on NERs. The remainder of this section broadens out these lessons, presenting a conceptual 
framework and research agenda conjoining extant interpretations so as to develop a multi-
dimensional understanding of employee silence.   
 
The core of this framework revolves around notions of silence as a relational dynamic – 
focusing on the phenomena as something derived from either management or workers. 
Seeing silence as a relational concept leads to interpreting the phenomena as functioning as 
part of the “frontier of control” in the workplace. A frontier of control develops between 
those aspects of the employment relationship set unilaterally by the employer and those 
aspects which are inherently more contestable as part of the wage-effort bargain (Goodrich, 
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1920). Also termed a “contested terrain”, the frontier is not static and is shaped by the 
interaction of both management and employee strategies in furthering their respective 
concerns in the employment relationship (Edwards et al. 2006, p. 129). Control is therefore 
situation specific, dependent upon the variability of managerial intent and behaviour as well 
as worker resistance and consent. Organisational silence under our framework is perceived as 
a component in the control dialectic, with silence acting either ‘for’ or ‘against’ either parties 
respective concerns. The corollary is that the capacity to articulate voice is one of the 
principal vehicles in which agents may attempt to pursue their particular agendas. Figure one 
presents these ideas in graphical form, with the arrows signifying whether silence is 
advancing or thwarting the concerns of either party.  
 
Figure1 
 
In the ‘northwest’ of the figure, as outlined in the previous section, management may opt to 
‘close off’ areas for employee voice, preserving their capacity for control and ensuring 
minimum disruption to the exercise of their prerogative. In terms of a research agenda, there 
are multifarious implications. It may involve, for example, examining how management 
explicitly construct and include issues on the voice agenda. The consequence of this 
quadrant, given that management enclosure of voice has occurred, is that silence operates to 
the disadvantage of employees, thwarting their capacity to have their own particular 
independent concerns adequately raised and addressed. The literature often appears to suggest 
that this silencing can be delivered in the form of either the ‘velvet glove’ or ‘iron fist’. A 
classic example is Garrahan and Stewart (1992) study of a management inculcated corporate 
culture which was designed to displace any opportunities for workplace antagonism at 
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Nissan. Even where this consensual ideology failed to be embraced, employee passivity and 
in turn, their silence, could be guaranteed by the less sophisticated formula of telling 
employees to simply ‘put up or shut up’. Management intentions and outcomes can be quite 
different; Creating voice structures also creates expectations and while management may 
wish voice to be defined around certain issues, their ability to do so cannot be taken for 
granted. Equally, if management intent is to create a weak or non-threatening structure then it 
can be seen by workers as a body with no independence that, paradoxically, may well 
encourage workers to look outside for someone to represent their views (Kaufman and Taras, 
2009) 
 
In terms of developing a research agenda, questions are raised as to how employees respond 
to the consequences of the ‘southwest’ of the figure, indeed if at all. It may simply be that 
employees themselves are not aware of managerial efforts to design a voice architecture that 
is heavily circumscribed. Management might, for example, present a vehicle which is de 
facto ineffectual for the articulation of independent employee voice, but this action may come 
to be simply acquiesced by the employees depending upon the particular aspirations they 
bring to the employment relationship (Rosseau, 1995). This potential acquiescence, of course, 
makes it problematic to read the construction of silence by management as acting against 
employees concerns unless one is prepared to declare, as much of the voice literature implies, 
that the latter have an ‘objective interest’, whether they realize it or not, in articulating a 
robust voice agenda that invariably clashes with management. Indeed, it might be said that 
the approach to date has been to interpret the lack of voice avenues as a negative for 
employees, without gaining a deeper understanding of the ways in which it may actually 
affect them. 
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 Where the deliberate pursuit of voice by employees is curtailed or blunted by virtue of 
existing organizational arrangements or where employees believe that it may not be to their 
advantage to ‘speak up’, it is argued that the southeast is the attendant outcome. In this 
regard, it is possible to re-integrate some of the typical concerns expressed in the 
organisational behaviour approach to silence without succumbing to their unitary 
predilections.  In the ‘southeast’ of the figure, workers may withhold information from 
management in an effort to exert control over the work relationship and not just through the 
fear of management reprisal. Given that organisations are composed of a myriad of 
competing agendas, workers may chose to be silent in order to advance their concerns vis-à-
vis management. It may be that workers in particular circumstances come to recognise the 
importance of information as a resource and thus choose to withhold it in what are perceived 
to be zero-sum situations with management (c.f.Moule, 1998).   
 
In many respects, the ‘southeast’ aspect of the figure might be read as causally related to the 
outcomes of the ‘southwest’, where workers are consciously aware that their sphere of 
influence within voice regimes is being curtailed by an recalcitrant management. Under such 
circumstances, frustrated hopes lead to employee disengagement who upon perceiving their 
voice to be curbed, respond by refusing to participate meaningfully in management sponsored 
arrangements. This approach resonates with Fox’s (1974) thesis that a management perceived 
to treat its workforce in a low-trust fashion, subsequently engenders low-trust responses from 
disapproving employees. Under these conditions, as the ‘northeast’ specifies, managerial 
ambitions for the voice regime languish in the face of an organizational silence predicated on 
employee cynicism and mistrust. For example, management efforts to affect a voice regime 
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under the strictly business orientated remit of quality circles and/or team meetings may fail to 
take root upon unfertile soils where poor employee morale and low commitment find a 
mainstay. One unexplored aspect of this area is the response of management to worker 
abstinence in such situations. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has critiqued the dominant approach to conceptualising employee silence in the 
literature. A case has been made that shows how present efforts suffer from a number of 
limitations, principally revolving around the narrow unitarist assumptions underlying the 
research and the predominant focus on organisational silences as a communicative choice 
undertaken by individual employees. The central argument is not that this approach is 
incorrect, but rather that it misses out on the significant power-centred role of management in 
structuring employee silences on a range of issues in the employment relationship. It is thus 
necessary to focus on how management can, through the design of particular institutional 
arrangements, perpetuate a climate of silence over a range of issues, effectively organising 
them out of the voice process in organisations. Whilst ‘observing’ silence might be seen to 
pose challenges with regard to appropriate research instruments, it need not be so. The 
essence of the framework points to the importance of examining management and worker 
motivation and behaviour in advancing, curtailing or suspending voice in organisations. 
Attitudes, behaviours and their underlying motivations in this context can be readily captured 
through established research methods and in turn reviewed and explained by recourse to the 
framework. The intention in advancing this framework is to re-train existing debate around 
silence into a much richer sociology of work research agenda. This framework could 
incorporate further research around wider issues such as the role of silence in gender or 
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bullying, as well as more traditional voice scholarship. Certainly, there is scope for this 
agenda in the context of how management are responding to new legal regulations aimed at 
institutionalising voice at work. While research carried out to date on the institutionalisation 
of voice has focussed on the structures which this legislation has prompted, the framework 
presented above could be used to understand both how employers may limit the efficacy of 
such bodies and the reasons why employees may be reluctant to engage with them.    
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